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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RONALD L. BAXTER and SHIRLEY
DIANE BAXTER, husband and
wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD., a
Utah Corporation,
An Involuntary
Plaintiff,

Case No. 860562

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant, ThirdParty Plaintiff
and Respondent,
vs.
ROBERT REES DANSIE and MARIE
GROW DANSIE, his wife; DAVIS
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; DAVIS
COUNTY ASSESSOR; DAVIS
COUNTY RECORDER; and WEBER
COUNTY, a Body Politic of
the State of Utah,
Third-Party
Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRAKSPORTATION, DAVIS AMD WEBER COUNTIES

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Insofar as the Respondents, Utah Department of
Transportation, Weber County and Davis County are concerned,
there are no issues to be decided by the Supreme Court and
consequently, the Judgment of the Lower Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants instituted this action to quiet title to
a six acre tract of land located at the mouth of Weber Cannon.
The Appellants purchased this six acre tract as a part of an 18
acre tract of land from Respondent, Davis County, at a tax sale.
The Respondents asserted in their responsive pleadings that the
Appellants did not have title to the property because it was
located in Weber County.

A trial was held before Judge Ronald 0.

Hyde who determined that the property was located in Weber County
and consequently, quieted title in the Respondent, Utah Department of Transportation.
The Lower Court bifurcated the trial of the issues in
this case.

It was determined to first try the issue of whether

the property was located in Weber County.

If the Appellants lost

on this issue, which they did, there was no reason to then try
the issue of whether the Respondent, Davis County, conducted the
tax sale properly.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Just prior to May 25, 1964, the Third-Party Defendant,
Robert Dansie (he was a Utah attorney who is now deceased),
hereinafter referred to as "DANSIE," was the owner of approximately 24.41 acres located near Uintah Junction where the Weber
River intersects with U.S. Highway 89.

The property in question,

according to the Davis County plat maps, was located north of the
existing Weber River.

(R. 328).

In May of 1964, the Respondent, Utah Department of
Transportation, purchased the property in question by Right-ofWay Contract (R. 330, D-23) and Warranty Deed from the ThirdParty Defendant, Robert Dansie.

(R. 329, D-22).

The Deed was

recorded in Davis County on June 17, 1964, but the Respondent,
Davis County, only recognized, for recordation purposes, the
description in the Deed which followed the portion of property
which was designated "also in Davis County."

(R. 329). This

particular description involved a small tract of property which,
in fact, was situated south of the Weber River.

The Deed in

question was then later sent to the Respondent, Weber County,
for recordation.

The Deed was held by the Respondent, Weber

County, until September of 1970, when if finally received a
recordation seal.

(R. 329). The Respondent, Davis County,

refused to recognize the validity of the Deed and so the Deed was
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changed so that Davis County would finally recognize the Deed for
recordation purposes.

The Deed was then re-recorded as a lis

pendens to prevent further transfers of the property.

(R. lllf

112) .
The taxes on the property in question were not paid
for the years of 1964 through 1968 in Davis County and consequently/ came up for tax sale in May of 1969.

Apparently/ both

Davis and Weber County had been each taxing the same property.
The parties who purchased the property at the Kayf 1969/ tax sale
(R. 410/ P-2)/ were Thomas Holberg [Rio Vista, Involuntary
Plaintiff/ that Default Judgment was entered against (R. 287)]
Ronald Baxter (Appellant) and Ronald Toonef [Plaintiff in Civil
No. 20915/ (R. 106-107)].

The Appellant/ Mr. Baxter, is

currently an engineer for the Utah Department of Transportation
and was alsof at the time he purchased at tax sale the property
which his employer/ the Respondent/ Utah Department of Transportation, had previously purchased from Dansie.

(T. 183/ R.

696) . The facts appear to be that the Respondent/ Davis County,
probably sent tax and sale notices to Dansie for the years in
question, but the Appellant/ Utah Department of Transportation,
did not receive any such notices. Dansie/ since he had
previously sold the property/ disregarded the tax notices from
the Respondent/ Davis County.

The Respondent, Weber County,
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did not attempt to assess taxes on the property in question,
since they recognized the Respondent, Utah Department of Transportation, as the lawful owner of the property in question.
(R. 85)•
The tax sale purchasers, Holberg (Involuntary Plaintiff) , Baxter (Appellant) and Toone (Plaintiff in Civil No.
20915), then divided the property, each taking six (6) acres and
paid taxes to Davis County until 1978.

(R. 697, T. 144).

In January of 1975, the tax sale purchasers and the
Respondent, Davis County, were notified of the invalidity of the
tax sale.

(R. 43).
In August of 1975, a contractor for the Respondent,

Utah Department of Transportation, LeGrande Johnson Construction
Company, entered upon a portion of the 18 acres in question and
set up a gravel crushing operation.

Shortly thereafter, one of

the tax sale purchasers, Ronald Toone, in Civil No. 20915 in
Davis County, commenced a damage action against LeGrande Johnson
Construction Company.

(R. 85, 86).

The foregoing action in Civil No. 20915, resulted in
a Judgment against the Plaintiff on December 13, 1976.
107, copy attached, marked Exhibit "A").

(R. 106-

The Plaintiff, Toone,

was represented by Mr. Glen E. Fuller, the same attorney who is
now representing the current Plaintiffs.
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(R. 106). The Trial

Court found that the property in question was not located in
Davis County and, therefore, was improperly assessed and sold at
tax sale.

(R. 106-107).

At least 10 maps were shown to the jury

from 1892 to the present time which established the location of
the Weber River.

The Plaintiffs attempted by parole evidence to

dispute the ten maps in question.
in Davis County.

(R. 106-107).

The Judgment was then recorded

During the pendency of the Toone

action, a Motion to Join the other tax sale purchasers (Baxter
and Holberg) was made to the Court which the Plaintiffs opposed
and the Court denied.

(R. 49).

As a result of the Toone Judgment, Davis County then
abated and refunded the taxes which the Appellants in the present
action had previously paid.

(R. 108, 109). Then the Respondent,

Davis County, marked its plats and tax records reflecting that
the entire 18 acres in question were located in Weber County.
(R. 110) .

Since 1978 to the present, none of the three tax sale

purchasers have paid taxes on the 18 acres in question and Davis
County has neither assessed the 18 acres in question nor accepted
any taxes with respect to it.

(R. 722, 723).

The current Appellants in Civil No. 74206, filed
their Notice of Claim in May of 1978 (R. 4, 5 ) , and their
Complaint (R. 1-3) in May of 1979, in the District Court of Davis
County.

The Davis County Court then granted the Respondent, Utah
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Department of Transportation's Motion for a Change of Venue to
Weber County.

The Davis District Court presumptively ruled that

the property in question was shown to be in Weber County.
(R. 33-35).

After the case was removed to Weber County the

Respondent/ Utah Department of Transportation, then filed its
Answer and Third-Party Complaint.

(R. 62-68).

The present Appellants feel they should be allowed to
retry the issue of the location of the Weber-Davis County line.
The six (6) acres which was conveyed to the Appellants lies
immediately east of the six (6) acres which was involved in the
Toone case and just west of the six (6) acres which Rio Vista
(Thomas Holberg) acquired/ and allowed Default Judgment to be
entered against.

(R. 287). It must be noted that the entire 18

acres in question lies north of the Weber River and is bordered
on the west and north by the freeway.

The location of the Weber

River determined the boundary between the two counties. The
Appellants' property lies north of the existing Weber River and
depends upon the validity of a tax sale from the Respondent/
Davis County.
Judge Gould (who was the same Judge who tried the Toone
quiet title action) then required that the Respondent/ Weber
County/ and the remaining tax sale purchaser/ Rio Vista Oil Ltd./
(company owned by Holberg) be joined in the present action.
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R. 62-68) . Rio Vista failed to file any type of responsive
pleading and Default Judgment was then entered.

(R. 28).

The Respondents, Utah Department of Transportation,
Weber County, and Davis County, then filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment in their favor upon the grounds and for the reasons that
no genuine issue of fact remains to be decided and, therefore,
Judgment should be granted in its favor as a matter of law.

The

Trial Court then granted the Respondents1 Motion for Summary
Judgment.
The basis for the District Court granting a Summary
Judgment was the fact that the present Appellant was an
interested witness in the Toone case and also the same issue
was tried in the earlier case and consequently the present
Appellant is now collaterally estopped from bringing the present
action.

The Supreme Court rejected these two arguments and

reversed and remanded the case back to the Lower Court.

(R. 326-

327) .
A Pretrial Hearing was held before Judge David Roth on
August 4, 1986.

The Judge felt the following issues should be

determined:
1.

In 1866 can it be determined there was a main

channel of the Weber River at the place in question, yes or no?
2.

If yes, when the main channel of the Weber River
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was located and described, where was its location?
3.

Was avulsive activity involved subsequent to the

time the main channel was located and described?

(Page 3 8 of the

Transcript of the Pretrial, copy attached, marked Exhibit "B").
The matter proceeded to trial before Judge Ronald Hyde,
sitting; without a jury on August 26, 1 986.

The evidence

established that as of 1866 the location and or main channel of
the Weber River could not be established.

That a definite

uncertainty existed as to the location of the boundary between
Davis and Weber Counties.

(The Weber River).

The two Counties

pursuant to Section 86.2 Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, effective
as of February 20, 1878, (R. 493-494), sought to resolve this
dispute with a survey of the Weber River.
Sec. 86.2 Whenever any dispute or uncertainty
shall arise as to any county boundary, the same
may be determined by the county surveyors of the
counties interested, and in case they fail to
agree, or otherwise fail to establish the boundary,
the county courts of either or both counties interested, may engage the services of the aforesaid
Territorial Commissioner, who, with the said county
surveyors, or either of them, if but one appear for
that purpose, shall proceed forthwith to permanently
determine such boundary line at the expense of the
counties interested by making the necessary surveys
and erecting suitable monuments to designate said
boundaries, which shall be deemed permanent until
superseded by legislative enactment. Nothing in
this act shall be construed to give the surveyors,
mentioned herein, any further authority than to erect
suitable monuments to designate said boundaries as
they are now established by law. (1)
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That in 1894, the surveyors of Davis and Weber Counties
surveyed the Weber River to determine a metes and bounds
description of the Weber River.

(R. 487). The surveyors1 notes

expressly state that it was the purpose of the two surveyors "...
to locate and make boundary lines common to Weber and Davis
Counties."

(D. 2, copy attached, marked Exhibit "C") . The Court

adopted the 1894 survey as the first time the exact location of
the Weber River was located and described by a metes and bounds
description.

(R. 485-489).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The issue on the location of the boundary between
Davis and Weber County has been ruled on by the Lower Court in
four separate instances.
In the case of Toone v. LeGrande Johnson Construction
Company Robert Dansie and Davis County. Civil No. 20915, District
Court of Weber County (Judge Calvin Gould).

This case involved

the six acres located immediately to the west of the six acres
involved in the present case.

The jury found in the Toone case

that the six acres located on the west side of the subject six
acres was located in Weber County.

(R. 47-48).

In the present case, Judge Cornaby presumptively ruled
that the subject six acres was located in Weber County.
35) .
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(R. 33-

In the present case, Judge Calvin Gould granted the
Respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment with a finding that the
subject six acres was located in Weber County.

(R. 258-259).

In the present case, the other tax sale purchaser
Thomas Holberg (Rio Vista Oil) failed to answer and the Lower
Court granted Default Judgment establishing that the easterly
contiguous six acres was located in Weber County. (R. 287-288).
As a consequence of the case of Toone v. LeGrande
Johnson Construction Company, Civil No. 20915, Davis County
changed their plat maps, tax rolls and tendered back the prior
taxes paid by the Appellant.

(R. 337-338).

This matter proceeded to trial on the issue of whether
the main channel of the Weber River could be located in 1866.
The Trial Court concluded that the main channel could not be
located in 1866.

Instead the Trial Court was forced to find that

the location of the Weber River was not described until the
official survey by the two counties which took place in 1894.
(R. 515-519).

The Court further held that the 1894 survey was

for the express purpose of resolving the location of the Weber
River so as to establish the boundary between Weber and Davis
County.

(R. 515-519).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE
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MAIN CHANNEL OF THE WEBER RIVER WAS UNCERTAIN
IN 1866 AND THIS DISPUTE WAS RESOLVED IN 1894
BY A SURVEY OF THE WEBER RIVER.
Since the time that both Davis and Weber Counties have
been recognized, the statutes have described the boundary between
Davis and Weber County as the Weber River.

The Trial Court

specifically found that the main channel of the Weber River was
not surveyed until 1894.

That as a consequence of this 1894

survey, Respondents, Davis and Weber Counties, accepted the then
described Weber River as its boundary.

(R. 515-518, D-2, copy

attached, marked Exhibit "D").
The formal recognition of these two Counties came at
the time of Statehood in 1898. Utah Code Ann. Section 17-1-3
(1953, as amended), states the following:
Existing counties adopted. The several counties as
they are in this chapter named and described are the
counties of the State until otherwise changed by law.
Section 17-1-9 and 17-1-32 of Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended) then described the boundaries of Davis and Weber
Counties as the channel of the Weber River.
The only evidence of where the location of the Weber
River was prior to 1894 were the GLO Survey notes of 1855, 1871
and 1886 (D-9, Exhibits "E", "F", and "G").

In 1855 the survey

notes along the section line show the width of the Weber River to
be in excess of 700 feet wide and there were two channels of the
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Weber River.

At no time during the trial of this case were any

legal descriptions provided of the possible location of the Weber
River either east or west of the Section line. (D-9 Exhibit "E")•
In 1871, the survey notes show the width of the Weber
River to be in excess of 900 feet wide (D-9) and show two
channels but in different locations than depicted by the 1855
survey (D-9 Exhibit "F").
In 1886 the survey notes show the Weber River to be in
excess of 900 feet wide (D-9 Exhibit "G") .
The maps which the Appellants have attached to their
brief were admitted into evidence and were considered by the
Court in making its ruling.

(See attached Exhibit "L".)

The Appellants relied upon an 1890 railroad map (P-6)
to establish the location of the Weber River in 1866. The
Assistant Davis County Recorder could not authenticate or verify
this particular Exhibit* also that Davis County recorded the map
in its private survey book and did not rely upon the map. Also*
there were no legal descriptions contained on the map.

(R. 595-

597) .
The Appellants also relied upon an old assessor map
(P-7).

The Assistant Davis County Recorder could not identify

the age of the map (R. 600, 602). When Exhibit D-8, which is
another assessor's map to the west is considered, it shows the
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Weber River in its present location.

(R. 607 Exhibits P-7 and

D-8 directly conflict with each other)•
The Davis County Surveyor was called as a witness by
the Respondents.

This witness was asked the following questions:

QUESTION:

Based upon your investigation, Mr. Elliot,

can you ascertain the location of the main channel of the Weber
River in 1866?
ANSWER:

I couldn't.

No.

(R. 570)

Also, the witness was asked the following questions:
QUESTION:

You've had occasion to familiarize yourself

with those GLO notes, have you not?
AHSWER:

I have looked at them, yes.

QUESTION:

Can you conclude from these notes where the

main channel of the river was prior to 1893?
ANSWER:

It appeared in the notes that in some of the

notes there is two channels and some there's three channels, and
I would not venture to guess which one was the main channel of
the Weber River.

(R. 563).

The Weber County Surveyor John Reeve was called as a
witness.
QUESTION:

I'm going to read to you the wording of the

statute, Mr. Reeve, and ask if your answer is still the same.
Can you tell us where the center of the channel of the Weber
River in 1866 was located?
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ANSWER:

No, I can't.

(R. 620)

Mr. Jack DeMass, Licensed Engineer:
QUESTION:

And based upon your expertise and your in-

vestigation, can you conclude where the channel of the Weber
River was in 1866?
ANSWER:

No, I can not.

(R. 637-638).

The Appellant, Mr. Ronald Baxter, testified:
QUESTION:

So if we take the 1855 from the right bank

to the left bank, we've got almost 899 feet.

If you go from the

left bank to the current location, you've got 700 feet.
ANSWER:

700 plus feet.

> . 732).

The Appellants, on Page 22 of their Brief, concede " • . .
there was no legal description showing the exact location of the
Weber River where it flowed in 1866 ..."
A Review of Findings of Fact is controlled by Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, 52(A), which now provides in pertinent
part:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the
facts specially and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon.... Findings of facti whether based
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.l
Ashton v. Ashton, Sup.Ct. No. 19129 (1987).
The Respondents feel the case of San Juan County v.
Grand County. 13 U. 2d 242 (1962) supports the decision of the
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Lower Court.

In this case, the legislature had defined the

boundary between the two counties as Parallel 38o30' north
latitude.

Apparently the two counties had difficulty locating

the parallel 38o30'.

The Lower Court dismissed both the

Complaint and Counterclaim because of the parties' failure to
comply with the provision of Section 17-1-33 U.C.A. 1953, which
reads as follows and is the successor to 86.2 Compiled Laws of
Utah 1888, which is cited on Page 9 of Respondents1 Brief:
Whenever any dispute or uncertainty shall arise
as to any county boundary the same may be
determined by the county surveyors of the counties
interested, and in case they fail to agree or
otherwise fail to establish the boundary, the
board of county commissioners of either or both
counties interested shall engage the services of
the state engineer, who with aforesaid county
surveyors, or either of them, if but one appears
for that purpose, all having received due and
property notice, shall proceed forthwith to
permanently determine such boundary line by
making the necessary surveys and erecting suitable monuments to designate the boundaries,
which shall be deemed permanent until superseded by legislative enactment. Nothing in
this section shall be construed to give the
surveyors or state engineer any further authority
than to erect suitable monuments to designate
boundaries as they are not established by lav;.
The Supreme Court held that the boundary between the
two counties was sufficiently clear and all the counties needed
to do was follow the statutory procedure in locating the boundary
upon the face of the earth.
In the present case, the legislature set the boundary
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between Webei. and Davis County as the channel of the Weber River.
The counties then followed the statutory procedure set forth in
86.2 Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, when because an uncertainty
existed, the surveyors of Davis and Weber Cc \ mty in 1 894 , jointly
surveyed the channel of the Weber River to resolve the dispute.
(D-2).
The Appellants also cite the case of Barton v.
Sanpete County. 49 U. 188 (1916).

Apparently, a dispute had

arisen over the boundary between Sanpete and Juab Counties.
The evidence in the Trial Court supported a finding that, in
fact, the boundary line between Sanpete and Juab Counties was
in dispute.

The dispute was resolved in 1913 to permanently

resolve the dispute by enacting a new law.
inapplicable to the case at bar.

The case is really

The parties are in agreement

that the boundary between Weber and Davis Counties was the
Weber River, but a dispute or uncertainty exists as to the
exact location of the Weber River.

The follow up case to the

Barton case was Summit v. Rich, 57 U. 553 (1921).

In this

case it was thought that an uncertainty existed as to the
location of the county boundary between Summit and Rich
Counties.

The matter went before the legislature to enact a new

law which would resolve this apparent uncertainty.

The Supreme

Court held that the legislature could not enact a new law
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describing the boundary between the two counties without
attempting to follow the original description.

It only allowed

the legislature to redefine the county boundary when it found
that the old description was legally impossible to follow.
Respondents feel this case has no application to the case at
bar.
POINT II
THE RESPONDENT, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
SUSTAINED ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THAT A MAIN CHANNEL
OF THE WEBER RIVER DID NOT EXIST UNTIL 1894.
Admittedly, Judge Roth did rule that the "... burden
of proving the location of the property in question lies with the
Defendant, Utah Department of Transportation.11

(R. 491).

The Appellants have misconstrued the Court's ruling
when they state on Pages 28 and 29 of their Brief, that the
Respondents "...failed to prove that the subject property was
located in Weber County in 1866."
The Trial Court ruled after hearing all of the evidence
in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of its Conclusions of Law:
"1.

The preponderance of evidence shows that the

location of the Weber River in 1866, cannot be determined.
2.

The prior surveys indicated that the Weber River

was subject to change."
The foregoing comes as a result of two days of trial.
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The transcript, shows that the Respondents (Defendants) were.
required to proceed first in the lawsuit.

Apparentlyf the

Respondents must have met their burden of proof since the Court
ruled after hearing all of the evidence that the preponderance of
evidence shows that the location of the Weber River in 1866 could
not be determined.

the Appellants did not make a motion

AJLOU,

for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the Respondents1 case
in chief.

(T. 113).
POINT III
THE 1894 SURVEY OF THE WEBER RIVER WAS CONDUCTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 86.2 COMPILED LAWS OF UTAH
1888f WHICH ALLOWS THE COUNTY SURVEYOR TO SURVEY
COUNTY BOUNDARIES WHEN AN UNCERTAINTY SHALL ARISE.
The Court in Paragraph 4 of its Conclusions of Law

stated the following:
"That a definite uncertainty existed as to the
location of the Weber River, which caused an uncertainty as to
the county boundary, and pursuant to statute, this uncertainty
may be determined by county surveyors and was done in 1894, and
that survey established the boundary between the two counties.
(R. 518) .
The Appellants in their Brief rely upon the testimony
of Mr. Earl Kendall to establish the existence of an old rock
wall that had been

built.

The testimony was based upon what Mr.
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Kendall's father told him, which was clearly hearsay and was
objected to by Respondents' counsel.

(R. 124-126).

The Trial Court must have elected to believe the
testimony of Mr. Jack DeMass because he testified that the rock
wall was constructed at the time the highway up Weber Canyon was
constructed.

(R. 766-767).

Mr. DeMass identified Exhibit 25 as

the plans from which the road was built.
Exhibit "M").

(Copy attached marked

The rock wall was constructed at the time the

highway was constructed for the purpose of preventing erosion to
the new highway.

(R. 768). (Exhibit D-25 attached Exhibit "M") .

The Appellants in their Brief make the assertion
that no evidence was presented by the Appellants that in fact a
dispute existed between Davis and Weber Counties.
Mr. Elliot/ the Davis County Surveyor, researched the
Davis County notes which were referred to as (D-3).

Both Davis

and Weber Counties had access to the Surveyor General1s notes.
(R. 561). Also, on Page 15 of Exhibit D-3, Timothy Kendall was
complaining in 1894 that he was being taxed in both Davis and
Weber Counties.

Also, on Page 15 (January, 1893), the Clerk of

Davis County wrote to the Clerk of Weber County for notes of the
survey of the line between Davis and Weber Counties, and received
the answer that the Weber Surveyor had no notes.

The Davis

County Clerk also stated he investigated the complaint of Timothy
Kendall and concluded he did pay taxes in both counties, but
could not determine the amount of land involved because of "...
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the county line not being properly located in that county."

(See

Exhibits "H" and "I".)
Also, on Page 22 of Exhibit D-3, it states that "E-A.
Vail has been waiting for necessary data to-wit, the notes of the
county line between Weber and Davis Counties ..."
On Page 27 of D-3.

The matter of previously locating

the county line between Davis and Weber Counties was referred to
the surveyor to confer with the authorities of Weber County with
a view to permanently locating said line.

(April 2, 1894,

Exhibit "J")
On Page 40 of Exhibit D-3, the Clerk was instructed to
record the survey notes of the county line between Weber and
Davis Counties in the county record.

(May 7, 1894).

In

accordance with the foregoing, the survey notes of county line
common to Davis and Weber Counties were recorded in the Davis
County Commission Minutes on Page 41 of D-3, copy attached,
marked Exhibit "Kn.
The Appellants introduced Exhibit D-19 tor the purpose
of showing that as late as 1904 a dispute still existed between
Davis and Weber Counties.

This particular Exhibit in no way

refers to any problems that existed in the area of the subject
property.
The two counties in their attempt to survey the
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location of the Weber River were not attempting to relocate the
county linef but merely resolve an uncertainty as to where the
Weber River was in fact located,
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT RULED THAT ESTOPPEL BY DEED HAS
NO APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR. (R. 460).
The Appellants place a lot of emphasis in the fact that
a quiet title action was held and a decree issued on the 25th day
of March, 1946.

(R. 405-406).

The two descriptions set forth on

the decree are outlined on the aerial photo located between Pages
432 and 433 of the record.

The Weber County description is out-

lined in yellow, the Davis County description is outlined in red
and the subject property in blue.

(Cop^ attached/ marked Exhibit

"L") . As should be readily visible to this Court, the six acres
in question was quieted in both Davis and Weber Counties.

The

Appellants in their assertions to this Court have seemingly
ignored and misconstrued the doctrine of estoppel by Deed.

In

the very first quote contained in their Brief# 28 Am. Jur. 2d
Estoppel and Waiver Section 4, the Appellants attempt to define
estoppel by Deed.

The very essence of this concept contemplates

that one party to a Deed is estopped from denying the truth of
facts contained in the Deed which he gave to another party.

In

the present case, the Appellants are asserting because a prior
quiet title action (R. 405-406) alleges certain property to be
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located in Weber County (outlined in yellow on Exhibit "L") and
other property was located in Davis County (outlined in red on
Exhibit "L"), this creates an estoppel by Deed.

The subject six

acres property is outlined on the same Exhibit in blue.

It is

readily apparent that the descriptions contained in the decree
put the six acres in both counties.

Consequently, the decree

really stands for nothing insofar as any type estoppel is
concerned.
The Appellants quote Section 8 in their memorandum and
in the last section states that estoppel is only operable between
the actual parties and their privies to the Deed; strangers are
not bound.

There are absolutely no privity between the Appel-

lants and the Respondent Utah Department of Transportation and
this is evidenced by the decision of the Supreme Court previously
issued in this case.
The leading case in Utah on this doctrine is Douse v.
Kanmernan, et al., 122 U. 85 246 P.2d 881 (1952).

In this case

the Plaintiff originally acquired the property in question by Tax
Sale Deed.
Deed.

The Plaintiff then sold the property by Quit Claim

Subsequently, the Plaintiff acquired title from the prior

record title holder.

The Plaintiff was not estopped from assert-

ing the validity of the prior Tax Sale from which he obtained his
original Tax Deed.

The Court held that estoppel by Deed operates
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only where the conveyance is intended to convey a particular
estatef which the Grantor subsequently acquires/ the Grantor then
becomes estopped to deny an after acquired titled/ and consequently/ becomes estopped to defeat his original grant.

This has

no application to the case at bar.
CONCLUSION
The Judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed in
favor of the Respondents, Utah Department of Transportation,
Davis County and Weber County.
Respectfully submitted 9
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

ST-EPHENyC. WARD
Assistant Attorney General

y ^ - v ^ w H^XK2GERALD HESS
Assistant Davis County Attorney
•

/

&dji±ALkid£

CHRIS DAVIS
Assistant Weber County Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing
Respondents1 Brief, were mailed, postage prepaid, to Glen E.
Fuller, 245 N. Vine Street #608, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103,
Chris Davis, Weber County Attorney, Weber County Courthouse,
Ogden, Utah 84401, and Gerald Hess, Assistant Davis County
Attorney, Davis County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, this / /
day of September, 1987.
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EXHIBITS

STEPHEN C. WARD
Assistant Attorney General
115 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: 533-6684

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RONALD A, TOONE,
Plaintiff,
-v-

:
:
:

LEGRANDE JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation,

JUDGMENT ON VERDICT
AND ORDER OF TEE COURT
Civil No. 20915

:
Defendant and Third
Party Plaintiff,
-v-

:
:

ROBERT REES DANSIE and
MARIE GROW DANSIE, his wife;
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
DAVIS COUNTY ASSESSOR, and
DAVIS COUNTY RECORDER,

:
:
:

Third Party Defendants. :

This matter came on for trial on the 13th day of
December, 1976, before the Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge of
this court.

The plaintiff, Ronald A. Toone, was represented

by his attorney, Glen E. Fuller; the defendant, LeGrande
son Construction Company, was represented by their attorney,
diepnen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General; the third party
defendants, Davis County, were represented by their attorney,
Steven C. Vanderlinden, Deputy Davis County Attorney, and the
third party defendants, Dansies, were represented by Robert
Rees Dansie.

A jury of eight persons was regularly impaneled

and sworn totay said action.

Witnesses on behalf of both

parties were sworn and testified concerning the location of the
S»5 of N*5 of the SW% of Section 25,
5 N., 1 W., S.L.M. containing 18 acres.
After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, and the

instructions of the court, the jury retired to consider their
verdict, taking with them the exhibits which had been offered
and received and the written instructions of the court. The
jury subsequently returned to the court, and through its foreman,
Aid they answered the single interrogatory submitted to them
as follows:
"Do you find it proven by a preponderance
of evidence that the land in question lies
within the boundaries of Weber County, Utah?"
Answer: Yes.
Wherefore, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premise
aforesaid,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiff's
Complaint is hereby dismissed.

That the westerly six (6) acres

located in the
Sh of the North h of the SWJ* of Section 25,
Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey is located in
Weber County.
The court hereby reserves to the plaintiff, the
right to cross plead against the third party defendant, Davis
County, as to any cause of action the plaintiff may have.
Dated this 7 c~

day of Jfrff/zJlsUA/

, 1977.

B1KTHE COUR
com V? »AV« eouwH\WAK PO M W « W
nSTTHi AMNBOB V k***0~* • A VIM AMD
RJU con o* AM oowiui »ocuMPtr M A I M
TMBw^^O^—j^^d^^.
IT

'

J^JDCTCAIAflNGOUI^

_u&fcdty^
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment on Verdict
and Order of the Court to Glen E. Fuller, Attorney for Plaintiff,
15 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Robert Dansie,
Attorney for Defendants, Dansies, 5085 South State Street, Murray,
Utah 84107; and Steven Vanderlinden, Deputy Davis County
Attorney, Attorney for Defendants, Davis County, Davis County
Courthouse, Farmington, Utah 84025, this

-A*W

N

J

day of

, 1977.
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1

strongly than what the Court did, your Honor.

2

the boundary was established by description, and Mr. Fuller

3

goes on to say was not only established, but was determined to

4

be the main channel of the Weber River in the area of the

5

subject

6

property.

The Court said

He has gone just that much farther.

And secondly, your Honor, he has gone on to further

7

state what the Court then went on to say, the Plaintiffs

8

contentions after that first paragraph.

The Court went on and

9 J said Plaintiff contends, plaintiff argues, and further—
10
H

THE COURT: ...You quarrel v/ith number two as being a
correct statement of law?

12

MR. WARD:

Well, I don't know it is that easy because

13

there^was no main channel of the Weber River.

And I think to

14

include that now might prejudice us later on to the effect that

15 I the Court has concluded there was a main channel of the Weber
16

Rive r . AJid.^V^<3A^^JLh^XiLJ^A£..JI.Ot.

17

THE COURT:

Okay, suppose we ask the Jury number one,

18

in 1866, can it be determined there w a s a main w channel

19

Weber River at the place in question, yes__orjno.

20

yes, was that main channel north or^south^jsms^

21

Number three, was there eyidencevof a sudden shift placing it

22

south?

23

your surveyors, diagramsf maps.

24

decide it.

25

Those three issues for the Jury.

MR. WARD:

If_XQ^_an^w^jr^ld

You call your experts,

You do the same thing, let thenj
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DAVID W. WILKINSON
Attorney General
DONALD S. COLEMAN, Chief - Bar No. 0695
Physical Resources Division
STEPHEN C. WARD - Bar No. 3384
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Utah Department of Transportation
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 363-7187
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
RONALD L. BAXTER and SHIRLEY
DIANE BAXTER, husband and
wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

RULING ON ORDER OF REMAND

vs.
RIO VISTA OIL, LTD., a
Utah Corporation,
An Involuntary
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 74206
(Supreme Court No. 86-0562)

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

RE: Defendant's Motion
to Strike Exhibits

Defendant, ThirdParty Plaintiff
and Respondent,
vs.
ROBERT REES DANSIE and MARIE
GROW DANSIE, his wife; DAVIS
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; DAVIS
COUNTY ASSESSOR; DAVIS
COUNTY RECORDER; and WEBER
COUNTY, a Body Politic of
the State of Utah,
Third-Party
Defendants.
ooOoo

In this action the above-named Plaintiffs Baxter filed
an Appeal from the Judgment of this Court entered on October 6,
1986, setting forth in their Brief on Appeal that certain
Exhibits used at the time of trial in this Court supported their
argument for a reversal of the aforesaid Judgment; and Defendant
Utah Department of Transportation having thereupon filed with the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah a Motion to Strike said
Exhibits; to-wit Defendants Exhibits D-14, D-15, and D-15,
contending in said Motion that the foregoing three (3) numbered
Exhibits had never been offered and received in evidence; and
After having considered Defendants Motion to Strike,
based upon written Affidavits and Memoranda and a hearing, the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah remanded the said Motion to
Strike to this Court for the purpose of making determinations on
specific issues set forth in the Order of Remand; and
The matter came on for hearing before the Honorable
Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge, on Friday, May 22, 1987, at the
hour of 11:00 a.nu, Plaintiffs appearing by and through Glen E.
Fuller, their attorney, and Defendant Utah Department of Transportation appearing by and through Stephen C. Ward, Assistant
Attorney General; and respective counsel argued the matter and
the Court thereupon examined the record and considered the same,
and being fully advised in the premises hereby determines and
orders that the issues certified to this Court by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah be, and they hereby are, answered as
follows:
-2-

1. Did this Court receive Exhibits D-14, D-15, and
D-16 in evidence:
ABSWER:

Yes, the Court relied upon the fact that the

Exhibit Sheet prepared by the Clerk of the Court showed the
Exhibits as being received into evidence.
2.

Did this Court have the Exhibits before it for the

purpose of making its decision in this matter?
ANSWER:

Yesf the Court orally indicated that it

remembered the Exhibits and what was contained thereon.
Page 16 of the Transcript:
Well, if they were utilized during the questioning of
witnesses, I certainly looked at them.
Page 18 of the Transcript:
That they were received, apparently, and were not taken
into chambers.
I don't know they would have made any difference if I
did have them, but apparently that's where it stands.
Page 19 of the Transcript:
They were not taken into chambers.
them.

I recall seeing

I can remember them to that extent.
DATED this

day of June, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

RONALD 0. HYDE
District Judge
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

GLEN E. FULLER
Attorney for Plaintiffs

STE&BM CJ( WARD
Attorney for Utah
Department of Transportation

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing RULING ON ORDER OF REMAND was mailed by first-class
mail, postage prepaid, to Glen E. Fuller, 245 North Vine Street,
#608, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103; Gerald E. Hess, Assistant Davis
County Attorney, County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah 84025; and
Chris Davis, Deputy Weber County Attorney, Weber County Municipal
Building, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 10th day of July, 1987.
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